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Folk Psychology and Legal Understanding
ROBERT BIRMINGHAM"
I write for Hugh with admiration and affection.
Law lags science. Canon law counts as law; think of Galileo. Or, less
jurisprudentially, Pius XI's endorsement of the big bang in 1951.' These
imprudences did no legal damage. The gulf between law and neuroscience
is arguably another matter, because here law uses theories of action and so
forth that are manifestly false, unless, conceivably, as I will mention again
later, one uses a pragmatic theory of truth. I'll approach this difficulty three
ways, addressing evolutionary psychology, legal responsibility imagined at
the neuronal level, and law among bacteria, in that order.
I. FOLK PSYCHOLOGY
As befits the theme rebellious leadership, I begin, although I do not
tarry at, an opinion by the second Justice Marshall, who as a civil rights
attorney led perhaps our greatest rebellion. The case is Ford v.
Wainwright,' in which Marshall wrote for the Court. Ford resolved the
question, could Florida execute an insane man? Well, of course not. So our
interest resides in why not, or more particularly in the trouble Marshall had
in articulating why not. Basically, he cited some legal authorities, who did
not explain themselves, and then said some things like the condemned
would not experience the terror of it all if he did not know what was going
on. That is, Marshall had no reason.
Keep in mind that insanity is a legal, not a medical, concept. And that
psychiatry is now a specialty of pharmacology. Then where did the concept
come from? From folk psychology. But that is not quite right either, really,
* Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. I thank my students Elizabeth b'=z and
Rich Rochlin; and my teachers May Aim Epstein, Duck 0. Kim, and Eric Lev Iz for their help In and
patience uIth my awkward initial neurosclentific efforts.
1. See HELGE KRAGH, COSMOLOGY AND CONTROVERSY 256-59 (1996).
2. 477 US. 399 (1986).
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the law made up the concept, presupposing folk psychology. Anyway I had
better define folk psychology at once.
"Folk psychology" denotes the prescientific, commonsense con-
ceptual framework that all normally socialized humans deploy in
order to comprehend, predict, explain, and manipulate the behavior
of humans and the higher animals. This framework includes con-
cepts such as belief, desire, pain, pleasure, love, hate, joy, fear,
suspicion, memory, recognition, anger, sympathy, intention, and so
forth.3
Right away by 'prescientific' the author acknowledges the conflict of law
with science. Moreover, as lawyers, we are comfortable with folk psycho-
logical concepts, and apply them unthinkingly and promiscuously. The
author's reference to Intention shows that the "and so forth" admits insan-
ity, volition, and responsibility.
Consider volition, starting at the apex of the Great Chain of Being-far
from bacteria, to which we are coming. Ask yourself whether God exer-
cises volition; and if so, what God can accomplish through this exercise.
The stock response is that God can exercise volition, and that he did so to
create the world ex nihilo. Just by saying, "Let there be light," etc. The
cash value of volition, then, is physical consequences. However, how God
or anyone gets from the spiritual to the physical is a great philosophical
puzzle.
Grtinbaum, a philosopher of science, finds the idea of this transmuta-
tion incoherent, in the first instance because God lacks a nervous system.4
In the history of philosophy, however, having a nervous system has not
helped much, the difficulty now being the interface between volition and
the nervous system. The pineal gland, the Cartesian pathway or bottleneck,
seems insufficiently broadband for such big work. Occasionalism (Male-
branche) would have God interpose his volition between human mental
cause and physical effect. But that just returns us to the original problem.
II. EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
Yet legal responsibility presupposes volition (it would not matter if
strict liability offenses, such as statutory rape or owning a radioactive land-
fill, were exceptions; yet here too responsibility imports having willed
something). A profession arising from, and repudiating, this presupposition
is that of mitigation expert.5 It is the task of the mitigation expert to excuse
3. Paul M. Churchland, Folk Psychology, in PAUL M. CHURCHLAND & PATRICiA S.
CHURCHLAND, ON THE CONTRARY: CRITICAL ESSAYS 1987-1997 3,3 (1998).
4. See Adolf Grtlnbaum, Theological Misinterpretations of Current Physical Cosmology, (visited
April 14, 2000) <http//www.skepties.orgllibrary/modem/adolfgrunbaumtheological.html>.
5. See Thomas v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 513, 515 (7th Cir. 1998).
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or explain the conduct of an offender as having been caused by events out-
side her control, the idea being, de tout conprendre, c 'est de tout pardoner.
Right here with the mitigation expert, while remaining broadly within the
framework of folk psychology, one can begin to subvert this psychology.
The field of evolutionary psychology exploits the fact that our brains are
optimized to respond to conditions in the past of our species, rather than to
modem circumstances, to which they have had insufficient time to adapt. A
scurrilous product of this psychology is Thornhill and Palmer's A Natural
History of Rape.6 The authors argue or at least assert, after thinking a lot
about misconduct among beetles, that millennia ago rape was a viable and
consequently evolutionarily selected strategy of transmission of genes; that
men still carry the concomitant genetic predisposition; and that women had
best beware!
We read a case alongside the book to produce anomaly. The case is
Joan v. E., reported in the Yearbooks of Edward II for the years 1313-
1314.8 Really there are two connected cases here, respectively civil and
criminal, arising from a charge of rape committed by E., the charge made
by Joan, the victim. Civil aspect first.
The record is not as transparent as it might be. Yet one can make out
that the pleading is oddly defective, Joan having omitted to allege rape.
The court dismisses Joan's suit on technical procedural grounds, directing
that Joan be imprisoned for poor pleading. What is left undecided in Joan
v. E. is the criminal action, rape being not only an offense against the vic-
tim, but besides, an affront to the peace and dignity of the king.
Here then is the rest of the case, as the court reporter hands it down to
us. Bereford, C. J., is about to sanction E. for, as the modem rendering puts
it, having "ravished the maid Joan." (A curious footnote at this point sug-
gests that the prosecution is not serious; I do not know what to make of this
footnote.) Joan is right there in court, not yet having been incarcerated. So
is E in court. Joan is carrying an infant in her arms, presumably hers.
Bereford: Who is the father? Joan: E. is the father. Bereford: Then E. is
"guilty of naught." How come? Bereford recognizes lack of consent as an
element of the common law offense of rape, and concomitantly believes
that a woman cannot become pregnant without having consented to the
sexual act.
Bereford speaks as if taking judicial notice: as though this rather eso-
teric biological proposition were transparent and within the common un-
derstanding, as for instance is the fact that midnight happens at night. This
apparent misapprehension was not infrequent in its day, and is repeated
6. R.ANDY THORNHILL & CRAIGT. PALum, A NATURAL HsOMRY OF RAPE BIOLOaCAL BASES
OF SExUAL COERCION (2000).
7. See Id. at 198-99.
8. See Joan v. E, in YEARBOOKS OF EDWARD 11, 1 THE EYRE OF KENT, 6 & 7 EDWARD II II
(Selden Soc'y No. 24, Frederic W. Maitland & Wilaim C. Boland, eds., 1909).
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(although with doubt of its truth) in Hawkins' respected Pleas of the
Crown, 1716-1721', which treatise further instructs us that rape was at
common law first a felony, punishable by death, unless the victim and her
attacker marry. One imagines such marriages were as happy as most. How-
ever, Hawkins goes on, the offense was later reduced to a great misde-
meanor, so that the rapist lost only his eyes and his testicles. In those days
the law did not fool around.
The modem legal scholar has invariably dismissed Joan v. E. as the
monstrous progeny of misogyny and medical misunderstanding. Doubtless
the consensus of scholarship would have continued thus, had Thornhill and
Palmer not enlightened us. Shortly after their sensitive and valuable ex-
amination of nonconsensual sexual relations among scorpion flies, the
authors write:
Human rape victims rarely show much sexual arousal and seldom
achieve orgasm. It is conceivable that some aspects of women's
capacity for orgasm evolved in the context of reducing the fertil-
izing capacity of rapists' ejaculates. That is, the absence of orgasm
during rape may be an evolved response to rape.10
That is, a woman's withholding orgasm prevents, or at least, reduces
the probability of, her pregnancy. Consequently, pregnancy is evidence of
orgasm, and (to shape the argument up a little) orgasm is evidence of con-
sent. If not conclusive, at least it raises a reasonable doubt, to put it anach-
ronistically.
In the nearly blinding light of evolutionary psychology, Joan v. E.
seems still stranger, and less misogynist than prescient. For how could
Bereford, and the common law that he declared, have uncovered the con-
nection between pregnancy and consent, by centuries anticipating Thorn-
hill and Palmer? Recall that even the concept paternity is not self-evident.
Yet we ought not be confounded by this prescience, the insight, if it be
such, being no more peculiar than the nearly unerring efficiency of the
common law, for instance respecting contract damages.
We may pursue the matter further. Is rape even possible? Sure, the ac-
tual entailing the possible. However, the argument in evolutionary psy-
chology against there being such a thing goes like this. Transparently, the
terminus ad quem of both sexes is viable grandchildren. Women who did
not want this were weeded out long ago. The strategies differ between the
sexes however. Whereas it pays a male in genetic transmission to father
children wherever he can, the cost (ultimately in energy) to him of doing so
being insignificant, a woman must invest in procreation deliberately. She
9. See WLLLAM HAWINS, I A TREATisE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 108-09 (London, 1716-
1721) (2 vols.).
10. THORNHILL & PALMER, spra note 6, at 99.
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should want as a partner whoever is best at having children, with her or
anyone else. Then he will transmit his genes, and hence his proclivities, to
their male children, who will also be good at procreating, leading to many
grandchildren. Hence a woman, the theory goes, will put obstacles in the
way of her suitors, testing them, eliminating those lacking fortitude or pro-
creative genius. However, who better than the rapist to overcome obsta-
cles?
Thornhill and Palmer do not endorse, or even notice, this argument.
Plainly it threatens a reductio, one woman's modus ponens being another's
modus tollens. Maybe the authors have not thought of it. Yet they neatly
foreclose it. For the rapist, they argue, is not the ultimate, but the marginal,
unfit reproducer-an individual unable to acquire procreative partners
through the usual material incentives. (That fertility depends on prosperity
is a theme that runs through the book.) In fact, the authors urge upon us,
frustrated reproductive strategy, that is, preempted female breeding choice,
is the source of the anguish of rape, precisely as pain signals prospective
tissue damage."1 A disclaimer that they properly make: To identify the
source of a sensation or emotion does not challenge its reality or denigrate
its intensity. Their characterization of the rapist would have to hold true of
social relations, such as they were, hundreds of thousands of years ago, as
gradually we evolved our tastes and proclivities. The authors are comfort-
able that it does.
3. Physiology
Consider then a minireview that appeared not long ago in Neuron,'" as
being unsettling in light of legal interpretations of responsibility. Its
authors, Leon and Shadlen, recite the significance of decisions about the
sensory world. I.e. incorrect decisions can get us killed. Manifestly how-
ever they did not get any of our ancestors killed, at least not prior to their
reproductive exploits. Leon and Shadlen start with a definition: "Th[e]
nonreflexive linkage between sensory input and behavior involves inter-
pretation and behavioral selection, what we refer to as a decision
process."" This makes sense. The language 'nonreflexive' implicates in-
tent. It is these decisions, or more properly their behavioral consequences,
that as attorneys we assess, and to which we assign legal responsibility.
The authors report upon behaving monkeys, chimpanzees being pro-
hibitively expensive, mice being insufficiently nonreflexive, it being im-
practical or impolitic to implant recording electrodes in the heads of human
subjects. Typically, an experimenter provides a monkey with a visual
stimulus, to which the monkey indicates a direction (left or right). The in-
11. Seeid.atlOW-03.
12. See Matthew I. Leon & Michael N. Shadlen, Exploring the Neurophjyslolog, of Dectsions, 21
NEURON 669 (1998).
13. Idat669.
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centive for the choice is a sip of water or something. Often there is a region
of equivocal stimuli, within which the monkey with some significant prob-
ability chooses either direction. Patterns of neuronal activity to identical
stimuli in sensory areas of the cortexes of these monkeys predict how they
will choose. Nevertheless, these sensory neurons are not good general deci-
sion neurons, the authors tell us. The neurons are largely silent without
sensory input, although deciding can continue past its stopping.
Conversely, particular neurons at the sensory-motor interface, often firing
with delays, appear to encode both sensory and motor properties, and are
increasingly often proposed as loci of decisions. With few exceptions, rele-
vant experiments so far have observed monkeys committing themselves
immediately upon presentation of the stimuli. Thus one can watch them
behave, but not see them ponder. Leon and Shadlen have presented
equivocal, threshold stimuli that are less straightforwardly resolved into
behavior. The posterior parietal cortex turns out to be a locus of decision in
the sense that differential activities of its cells predict behavior (perhaps a
shift of gaze to right or left) seconds before eye movements.
The authors conclude that these latter studies "provide the most com-
pelling evidence yet for a neural correlate of a decision mechanism." 4
What do they mean by "correlate"? I.e. is not the decision mechanism the
activities of the neurons themselves? There appears not to be a nonneuro-
nal level of deciding above these activities. Their language I interpret as
scientific reticence.
So this is the underlying science. Now let us shift closer to law. A
novel, Brain Storm by Richard Dooling,' an attorney, expresses this sci-
ence in the popular idiom, amid moments of its characters' extravagant
passion. Here is a didactic interlude:
So the narrative which most accurately represents the neuroscien-
tific sequence of shooting a man goes like this. One, a burst of neu-
ral activity in the motor cortex initiates movement by sending a
message to the trigger finger. Two, after three hundred millisec-
onds, the individual becomes subjectively aware that an impulse to
kill has originated somewhere in his brain, and that a signal is be-
ing sent to his trigger finger. Three, during the two hundred to two
hundred fifty milliseconds after awareness and before actual
movement occurs, other parts of the brain decide whether to inter-
fere with or counteract that signal, which was launched precon-
sciously, almost half a second before. Four, the brain either stops
the action, or allows the trigger finger to move.'
6
14. Id at 671.
15. See RICHARD DOOLING, BRAIN STORM (1998).
16. Id. at 119-20.
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But now we may discard consciousness as epiphenomenal: no evident
guiding intelligence resides above the hundred billion neurons, their tril-
lions of connections; nothing that decides or ratifies an otherwise purely
neuronal undertaking; only neurons modulating the activity of other neu-
rons. All is atoms and the void.
Then concepts like blame and responsibility are ungrounded, it being
unconvincing to assign blame by neuronal discharge. Nor are neurons the
end of it, because a neuron contains a billion proteins, themselves behaving
intricately.
IV. THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA DowN THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING
We may want grandchildren, yet implement this goal with such indi-
rection that it is not visible at all. That is what is nice about synthetic a
priori propositions. One may hold them without empirical support. Indefi-
niteness of terms hinders an effort to distinguish our species through the
intricacy and sophistication of this indirection. But beyond this, any such
sophistication has its counterparts among lesser players.
B
-C
-C 1 0
1 0
A
C 10 6
Figu 1. Pzissor Dia=
At least since Hobbes, a jurisprudential tradition has measured law by
its ability to resolve the prisoner's dilemma."7 I show that nematodes and
viruses play the prisoner's dilemma, but curiously that bacteria do not.
Given the Hobbesian criterion, and the requisite suspension of disbelief,
societies of bacteria are candidates for possessing a legal order.
The prisoner's dilemma is a game--in a technical mathematical sense
- whose heuristic narrative is as follows. Two prisoners, A and B, are
charged with a felony, for instance robbing a bank. Separately they must
choose to confess or not confess. The payoffs are: if both confess, each
serves five years; if neither confesses, each serves one year (from convic-
17. See DAV GUrIm, MORALS BYArOREEBaT (1987).
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tion on a lesser weapons charge, or as the risk-neutral expected loss from
trial on the robbery charge with a probability of conviction of 1/6); if one
prisoner confesses and the other does not, the prisoner who confesses goes
free, while the other serves ten years. Figure 1 shows the game.
The game has a solution, i.e. a Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium,
named for the Nobel Laureate John Nash, who discovered it, is a set of
choices such that no prisoner can increase her payoff by changing her
choice unilaterally. This set of choices is that both prisoners confess, with
each prisoner serving six years. Starting from this set of choices, either
player serves four additional years by changing her choice.
Yet both prisoners confessing is the sole outcome-the single set of
payoffs-that is not Pareto optimal. A set of payoffs is Pareto optimal if it
is not possible to shift to another set so as to increase the utility of one
player without decreasing that of the other. In the prisoner's dilemma, a
shift to neither prisoner confessing reduces the sentence of each prisoner
by five years.
The analysis assumes that years served is a satisfactory surrogate for
utility; that the prisoners cannot contract (that is, that between or among
themselves they are in a state of nature); and that they do not love each
other, in the economist's sense of love: having interdependent utility func-
tions. It does not assume that the prisoners have committed the offense, for
the game is adequately described without alluding to this.
Each participant is better off confessing whatever the other does, so
knowledge of what the other will do has no bearing on one's choice, as
opposed to the payoff from that choice. Nor does trust have anything to do
with the game: were one prisoner to trust the other not to confess, she
would confess nonetheless, happy that she goes free. An expected result is
that each prisoner swears steadfastness, then both rat out.
The game is not trivial. At least one philosopher, David Gauthier, has
spent his professional life, and risen to prominence, reflecting on this
game. We play it incessantly: law enforcement relies on it; arms races and
cheating on oil quotas are instances of it; professors force its play upon
their students. Here however we treat play among lesser creatures. We will
be treating games with n players (in the game as stated, n = 2).
The legal opportunity will be with bacteria. Therefore let us bracket
them biologically, by nematodes on one side and by viruses on the other.
Nematodes are worms, thus multicellular. Viruses are intracellular para-
sites - DNA or RNA having protein coats. Bacteria are cells.
Nematodes and viruses play similarly, so that a single description of their
play nearly suffices for both. Following Herre,8 I describe that of nema-
todes of the genus Parasitodiplogaster.
18. See E. Allen Herre, Population Structure and the Evolution of Virulence In Nematode Parasites
of Fig Wasps, 259 SCIENcE 1442-45 (1993).
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Herre studied eleven species of Parasiodiplogaster native to Panama.
Each species parasitizes a distinct species of wasp. Each species of wasp
pollinates, and reproduces inside the synconia of; a distinct species of fig.
The wasp and nematode life cycles are as follows: Gravid, pollen-bearing
foundress wasps penetrate the figs, pollinate them, lay eggs, and perish.
Their issue eclose and mate inside the fig, the females departing to repeat
the cycle. Six or seven nematodes enter a fig with an infected foundress
wasp. They feed on the wasp, mate, and die. Their issue hatch as the young
wasps eclose, attach themselves to these wasps, and accompany them to
other figs.
The wasps differ by species in the probability, p, that their figs contain
other foundress wasps, hence eventually infant wasps of multiple mothers.
The virulence, v, of a parasite is the proportion of its host's resources it
appropriates, a proxy for which is how much the parasite curtails its host's
fertility. This is a good proxy because, remember, the bottom line in re-
source use is how many grandchildren one leaves.
Across the species of nematodes studied, virulence correlates with the
probability of multiple broods within the figs of the species wasps they
parasitize, as shown in the table below. Fitting by least squares gives the
equation:
v = 0.183873p + 0.00471197.
Think of a wasp as passive, while its nematode decides the proportion
of the resources of the wasp it appropriates. This proportion ranging from
zero, indicating that on balance it pays back what it takes from the wasp, as
it must if only one wasp occupies a fig, as noted below;, to one, which indi-
cates that the resources of the wasp make only infant nematodes.
The higher the proportion of resources that a nematode appropriates,
the more infant nematodes it makes, at the cost of making fewer infant
wasps. A nematode, to transmit its DNA, needs both infant nematodes and
infant wasps; yet except in the limit case of one wasp per fig, only the
pecies portion o irulence
_ultiple Broods
!umbrinema ).01 -. 01
ffornema .01 .03
aranena 3.8 0
ertanema .10 .01
blusinema .17 .06
ullenem ).18 0.01
mtrenema .22 .07
openema K.42 .08
ympanema .45 .10
emi~n P.69 P.16
op enema P.76 P.11
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nematodes, i.e. not the wasps, need be the nematode's own. Imagine such a
simple case first, that is, a case with one wasp per fig, and additionally,
merely to keep the mathematics transparent, one nematode per wasp. The
fates of the descendants of wasps and nematodes are then inextricably con-
nected; and the equilibrium virulence is 0, lest the wasp be selectively dis-
advantaged, and the DNA of the nematode and that of the wasp become
extinct together. (At this moment, one should reflect briefly upon the si-
multaneous extinction of the passenger pigeon and the passenger pigeon
louse).
Because a wasp lacking a nematode and a nematode lacking a wasp are
equally improvident for a mother nematode, she optimizes by making the
same number of both. Now drop the assumption of just one wasp per fig.
Intuitively, optimal virulence increases, because the issue of a nematode
can parasitize the issue of wasps other than that it infects. So she should
concentrate on making nematodes, letting the neighboring nematodes make
the wasps.
If the situation is evolutionarily stable, however, all the nematodes of a
particular species do the same thing; and stability implies a Nash equilib-
rium, so that no nematode can advance its DNA by altering its behavior,
the behavior of the other nematodes in the fig being unchanged. Again
intuitively, the nematode will make nematodes until gain from the marginal
nematode equals the marginal cost in infant wasps.
A Mathematica program that consolidates and extends the observed
(and expected) behavior, written in terms of wasps per fig rather than prob-
abilities, is as follows:
virulenceList:=
Table[virulence[i], {i, 1, 20)]; Nashu~encesandUHIes
nashVirulence[nj := .
Solve[Join[Table "
[marginalUtility[i, n] 0, {i, 1, n}l, b os
Table[virulenceList[[I ]]- L / i
virulenceList[[i]], {i, 2, n}]], X
Table[virulenceList[[i]], {i, 1, n}]] oJ
//Flatten fl First # Last
nashVirulenceList[nJ : 4 , 8 to Is
Table[nashVirulence[i], {I, 2, n)]
nashVirulenceListPlot[nj :=
ListPlot[nashVirulenceList[n]]
The accompanying figure states the dependence of virulence upon
multiple broods as given by this program. What is happening is straight-
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forward. As the number of wasps per fig increases, each nematode appro-
priates more of the resources of the wasp it parasitizes to make nematodes
with its DNA. And with each nematode behaving thus, collectively the
wasps are overexploited, so that the utility of each nematode diminishes.
So does the utility of the wasps; but we will see that this decline of utility
of the host is not universal.
Now the virus (phage), for which the prisoner's dilemma lies on the
surface of recent scientific literature, so that we need not find the game
ourselves." The game plays out parallel with those among nematodes. The
phage release and sequester diffusible products within an invaded cell.
Familiarly, Turner and Chao measure viral fitness by reproductive ability.
As the intracellular viral load increases, the quantity released by each viral
particle declines, becoming increasingly suboptimal, in terms of this fit-
ness, consonant with the practice of nematodes. Turner and Chao gloss this
conduct as selfishness; however, we do not, because to do so is folk psy-
chology; and because, tautologically, everything acts in its own interest.
We move now to bacteria, and naYvely interpolate. A bacterium is a
subtle cell, hence must have evolved, as have we all, to play the prisoner's
dilemma. Additionally, the basis of this play is evident: bacteria release
virulence factors, which interfere with cellular and systemic functions of
their hosts. The purpose of this release is not to harm their h6sts per se, but
to benefit themselves. Again by our calculation, release of virulence factors
will decline disproportionately as bacterial concentration increases.
Remarkably and engagingly, virulence factors among the bacteria do
not decline. So we are doing real science, defined as proposing and testing
hypotheses. Moreover, it has only recently been seen to be false. Let me
tell the story briefly, it being too good to hold back. My exposition follows
that of Evelyn Strauss"
Appreciation of this bacterial behavior began in the 1960s with the dis-
covery of bioluminescence in Vfischeri. These bacteria, when sufficiently
concentrated, emit light. Their doing so helps the fish they live with
through preventing these fish from casting a shadow on the sea bottom in
moonlight. They evolved to do this, evidently, to protect their host..
How much light each bacterium emits, however, is not only a function of
the bacterial density (which from our analysis we expect) but a positive
function of this density (which assuredly we did not expect). And not only
a positive function, but not linear at all, as we will see. In the case of V.
fischeri, the bacteria release the small molecule acylated homoserine lac-
tone (acyl-HSL). So an enzyme, LuxI, makes this molecule. And the acyl-
HSL upregulates a second protein, LuxR. But not in a linear way. Nothing
19. See Martin A. Nowak & Karl Sigmund, Phage-Lift for Game Theory, 398 Nature 367-68
(1999); Paul E. Turner & Lin Chap, Prisoner's Dilemma In an RNA Vlrus% 398 Nature 441-43 (1999).
20. See Evelyn Strauss, A Synthony of Bacterial Voices,284 Soa'C. 1302 (1999).
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much happens until acyl-HSL reaches a certain concentration. Then LuxR
suddenly goes nuts. At first thought exceptional, the effect, called 'quorum
sensing', has in the 1990s been found in one form or another pretty much
wherever bacteriologists look.
But really things are not that bad, as follows. As I said, the field of
quorum sensing by bacteria is new. Its scientists are much taken with the
wonder that there is such an effect as quorum sensing - that bacteria are
that smart. And they merely speculate about what motivates the bacteria to
do such a thing. As reported by Strauss:
One reason bacteria might want to intercept their neighbors' mes-
sages [Leland S. Pierson III] says, is that "a large amount of signal
suggest that other bacteria are growing and happy. That tells the
bacteria that this is a great place to be." Another is competition. As
Pierson [an agricultural bacteriologist, if there is such a specialty]
puts it, "a plant root is not Club Med. There are limited nutrients,
and a bacterium needs to know who else is there so it can make de-
cisions about how to expend energy and succeed in that environ-
ment." In P. aureofaciens's case, this means making antibiotics to
inhibit the growth of competing organisms."
Now the attorney can live with this, because it is disarmingly na've.
Each reason that Pierson supplies for a bacterium to want to receive a mes-
sage is equally a reason for a bacterium not to want to send a message. Lots
of bacteria might be listening, but none would speak. In the longer run,
none would listen either. On the other hand, bacteria appear to have
evolved a legal system, by our criterion. Which probably says something
about our criterion.
The upshot of all this is an evident similarity between legal and lesser
behavior, which suggests their assimilation. No one wants to attribute re-
sponsibility to a bacterium, much less contemplate its insanity. But maybe
one does not want to do this for us either; at least not unreflectively, what-
ever this reflection amounts to.
V. CONCLUSION
So there you have it. How can an individual be blamed for her genetic
constitution? For the behavior of her neurons? Is a bacterium less responsi-
ble? Folk psychology is false. The law is built on it. Well, many falsehoods
are useful; the test is not whether a belief is true, but whether it works, if
these criteria differ. However, does the law work? And having bitten into
the neuroscientific apple, can we go back to the Garden as though nothing
has happened?
21. Id. at 1304.
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